I examine two kinds ofarguments in favour ofimposing restrictions on smoking by hospitalisedpsychiatric patients. First, I look at patient-centred arguments in favour of restrictions. These arguments focus on the benefits that patients will receive iftheirsmokingis stopped or curtailed.
Second, I examine arguments that seek to justify restrictions by citing the costs that smokers impose on others. Neither kind ofargumentjustifies any meaningful restrictions on the smoking ofhospitalised psychiatric patients.
Smoking by patients is a matter of increasing clinical concern. On the whole, increasingly restrictive policies towards smoking have prevailed. Various hospitals and health care facilities have adopted restrictive smoking policies. For example, in the United States the Indian Health Service (IHS) has recently forbidden smoking in its facilities (1) . Numerous other prominent US hospitals also limit or forbid smoking on their premises (2) .
So far, the most notable exception to this prohibitionary trend has been psychiatry (2) . Anybody familiar with the milieu of mental hospitals will understand why: psychiatric patients are frequently judged too emotionally fragile to cope with smoking restrictions (2) . More (3) . Only bureaucrats too busy monitoring triumphs of regulatory compliance could fail to notice that psychiatric hospitals, especially public hospitals, are smoke-filled.
Heavy smoking by psychiatric patients has occasioned alarm among clinicians. Many clinicians would like, if possible, to adopt the smoking policies that are becoming common in regular hospitals (1, 4 Though nobody doubts that restrictive smoking policies improve the health of psychiatric patients, clinicians should still examine the moral rationales for limiting smoking by hospitalised psychiatric patients; especially since psychiatric patients, unlike other patients, may well have to stay in hospital even if they express a desire to leave. And for some mental patients, in particular long-term chronic and geriatric patients, the hospital is often a home.
Two kinds of rationales for restrictive smoking policies need to be examined, and they need to be examined in the context of the psychiatric hospital. The first kind is patient-centred. This rationale does not concern itself with benefits to others. Rather, the sole concern is to defend smoking restrictions by citing the benefits that the patient will receive. The second kind is other-centred. Here the rationale focusses on the benefits that will go to others if patients have their smoking restricted. Arguments based on the harmful effects of secondary smoke to nonsmokers are typical of other-centred rationales. In practice, these arguments are usually advanced in tandem. For clarity's sake, the rationales should be examined one at a time; first, then, to patient-centred rationales.
Smoking is indisputably dangerous. Smokers put themselves at far greater risk of dying prematurely. Smokers have fastened upon a reliable means of turning their lungs into bags of snot and pus, their digestive tracts into oozing sores, and their cardiovascular system into a reliable source of income for cardiologists. Out of every 100 smokers, one can safely bet that 25 will die prematurely (6). Since mental hospitals have an obligation to put their patients' best interests first, and smoking endangers a patient's health interests, hospitals have some responsibility to restrict smoking.
The fiduciary argument against smoking admits of two forms. On the first form, a hospital's fiduciary responsibilities include beneficently-grounded duties to confer benefits on patients when doing so does not impose onerous costs on either the hospital or the patient. A hospital's obligation to have staff force a patient to walk following surgery or to supply a healthy diet, rather than whisky and sirloin, are two examples. Restrictive smoking policies might be thought to be another, since patients stand to gain some benefits from not smoking while hospitalised. The second form of the fiduciary argument holds that hospitals have beneficently-based duties to prevent harms to patients. For example, feeble, disoriented patients might be placed in restraints to prevent them from falling from their beds during the night. Neither form of the fiduciary argument is adequately compelling to justify strong restrictions on smoking by psychiatric patients.
The beneficently-based justification of a restrictive smoking policy to provide a benefit runs into a formidable problem. Though the desire to confer benefits on patients is laudable, conferring a benefit is not of itself a sufficient justification for restricting a patient's liberty. When conflicts between beneficentlygrounded duties and liberty arise, it is necessary to offer arguments to show that beneficence should take precedence over liberty. One might show, for example, that patients who refuse to rise from bed after surgery are being irrational. They want to recover. They do not want to develop pneumonia. These wants cannot safely be achieved if patients remain addicted to immobility. Typically beneficial hospital regimens help patients to achieve their own therapeutic goals, while minimising the likelihood that they will suffer harms deleterious to the achievement of their therapeutic goals. By contrast, smoking restrictions, though they benefit patients, do not facilitate psychiatric patients' recovery from the condition that brought them to the hospital in the first place. The restrictions do not improve the likelihood of the psychiatric patients achieving their therapeutic goals. And if the hospital's goal is merely to provide a benefit, without also lessening the likelihood of harms to patients that will interfere with their recovery, beneficence is not adequate to justify restrictions on liberty.
To see the inadequacy of such a justification, an example may help. If patients recovered as quickly and safely from surgery whether they languished in bed or got up to walk, nobody would seriously contend that staff should force them to walk anyway, on the beneficent grounds that walkers leave the hospital with gamelier legs. To justify acts of positive beneficence that limit a patient's liberty, the beneficent act should help improve the condition for which the patient is being treated, while lessening the likelihood of the patient's suffering an imminent harm that could occur if the beneficent act were not performed. Hence positive beneficence does not justify restricting smoking among psychiatric patients. Restricting their smoking does not further the treatment of the condition that brought them to the hospital. Nevertheless, it may be that a beneficently-based justification that focusses on the dangers of smoking will work.
Unfortunately this argument from danger to patients does not work. Though patients will enjoy better health if they smoke less or quit, the obligation hospitals have to safeguard their patients' best interests cannot by itselfjustify restrictive smoking policies. For better or (6, 9) . Smokers simply cannot make competent decisions about the habit.
The grounds for the foregoing argument are underwritten by familiar considerations favouring weak paternalism. It is sometimes permissible to prevent people from acting on decisions that are likely to cause them harm and that they are incompetent to make. A standard justification for weak paternalism is that it will prevent people from acting on decisions that they may well regret when they regain their competence. And given the extraordinarily high prevalence of smoking among psychiatric patients, perhaps it is reasonable to entertain the hypothesis that their disease process undermines their capacity to make autonomous decisions about whether or not to smoke. If it is replied that doctors do force regimens on patients who are hospitalised, the rejoinder is obvious. First, it is not at all obvious that that is an appropriate exercise ofmedical authority. Ifany psychiatric or nonpsychiatric patient's hospitalisation is likely to be protracted, it is less obvious that doctors do have a warrant for forcing undesired treatments or regimens on patients, unless one of two conditions is met. In the case of benefit-conferring treatments or regimens, the doctor should be able to show the undesired benefit helps to treat a condition for which the patient would competently want treatment, while lessening the likelihood of an imminent harm that the patient would not wish to suffer and that would likely occur if the patient did not receive the benefit. In the case of treatments and regimens designed to save the patient from harms, the doctor should be able to show that the prevented harm is one that the patient would wish to be prevented from suffering if competent. Neither of these conditions is ordinarily satisfied in the case of psychiatric patients.
Second, restrictions in non-psychiatric hospitals are typically aimed at facilitating a patient's recovery. But even in ordinary hospitals, the purpose of universal bans on in-hospital smoking are not patient-centred. They are best understood as efforts by the hospital to provide a safe environment for its non-smoking patients and staff, and sometimes to promote health values. But these are other-centred justifications for restrictive smoking policies.
This concludes my review of patient-centred arguments for restrictive smoking policies. I think I have shown that no patient-centred justifications exist for forcing patients to quit or for even restricting their smoking. I turn now to other-centred justifications.
Other-centred justifications have two variants: one focusses on the damage smokers do to non-smokers: the other on the social costs smokers impose on everybody.
The damage smokers do to non-smokers is beyond dispute. Though disagreement exists over how serious the damage is, nobody can reasonably deny that some damage occurs (11) . At a minimum smokers smell up a room. Evidence also exists that those who suffer prolonged exposure to sidestream smoke are more likely to get the very diseases that smokers themselves are more likely to get. A recent US study found that non-smoking wives who had smoking husbands were at 34 per cent greater risk of developing lung cancer than if they had husbands who did not smoke (11) . Given all this, there is an excellent other-centred justification for restrictive smoking policies. They protect non-smokers. Is that reason enough to justify restrictive policies in a psychiatric hospital?
The answer to that question will depend on how restrictive the policies being proposed are. The most an argument based on safety to non-smokers shows is that smokers should not be allowed to smoke wherever they feel like it. To sum up, the above arguments are not meant to show that restrictions on patient smoking are never appropriate. Anybody who has served in a psychiatric hospital knows that they often are. When smoking complicates the diagnosis of a patient at intake, it may be necessary to prevent the patient from smoking until a diagnosis is possible. It may even be that bans on smoking on acute wards where patients' stays will almost always be short are justified if the costs of providing a segregated smoking area to patients are great. As I again wish to emphasise, these arguments do not show that patients should be able to smoke wherever they want, and that means that they will also not be able to smoke whenever they want. For the comfort and safety of others it is surely permissible to limit patient smoking to particular rooms. What these arguments do show is that total bans on smoking for hospitalised psychiatric patients are morally indefensible, and that restrictions on patient smoking should be mindful of the special circumstances of the psychiatric patient. In 
